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Abstract We present progress on the experimental validation 
of a fundamental and universally applicable vulnerability analysis 
framework that is capable of identifying new types of 
vulnerabilities before attackers innovate attacks. This new 
framework proactively identifies system components that are 
vulnerable based upon their Kolmogorov Complexity estimates 
and it facilitates prediction of previously unknown vulnerabilities 
that are likely to be exploited by future attack methods. A tool 
that utilizes a growing library of complexity estimators is 
presented. This work is an incremental step towards validation of 
the concept of complexity-based vulnerability analysis. In 
particular, results indicate that data types (semantic types) can be 
identified by estimates of their complexity. Thus, a map of 
complexity can identify suspicious types, such as executable data 
embedded within passive data types, without resorting to 
predefined headers, signatures, or other limiting a priori 
information. 
 
Index Terms Information Assurance, Vulnerability Analysis 
Kolmogorov Complexity, Semantic Type, Complexity Map. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper assumes a fundamental understanding of 
Kolmogorov Complexity details, of which can be found in 
[13]. Vulnerability analysis as presented in this paper takes 
into account the innovation of an attacker. A metric for 
innovation is not new; 700 years ago William of Occam 
suggested a technique [12]. The salient point of Occams 
Razor and complexity-based vulnerability analysis is that the 
better one understands a phenomenon, the more concisely the 
phenomenon can be described. This is the essence of the goal 
of science: to develop theories that require minimum size to be 
fully described. Ideally, all the knowledge required to describe 
a phenomenon can be algorithmically contained in formulae; 
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formulae that are larger than necessary lack a full 
understanding of the phenomenon. Consider an attacker as a 
scientist trying to learn more about his environment, that is, 
the target system. Parasitic computing [1] is a literal example 
of a scientist studying the operation of a communication 
network and utilizing it to his advantage in an unintended 
manner. The attacker as scientist generates hypotheses and 
theorems. Theorems are attempts to increase understanding of 
a system by assigning a cause to an event, rather than assuming 
all events are randomly generated. If theorem x, described in 
bits, is of length l(x), then a theorem of length l(m), where l(m) 
is much less than l(x), is not only much more compact, but 
also ( ) ( )2l x l m− times more likely to be the actual cause than 
pure chance [12]. Thus, the more compactly a theorem can be 
stated, the more likely one understands the underlying cause. 
A very literal example of an attacker as a scientist who is trying 
to understand a phenomenon, i.e. the system being attacked, 
can be seen in [1]. The results in this paper analyze whether 
estimates of complexity have the required resolution to 
differentiate known types of data based upon their complexity. 
Early results simulated in Swarm, as well as an active 
network Java complexity probe toolkit [8][5][3][2][9] had 
formed the software base and motivating results for this work. 
A significant result of that work has been the proposition that 
complexity plays a critical role in security and can be broadly 
applied as the basis for security analysis and design. Tools 
based upon this paradigm do not require detailed a priori 
information about known attacks, but rather compute 
vulnerability based upon an inherent, underlying property of 
information itself, namely, its Kolmogorov-Chaitin 
complexity. The author suggests that active networks [3] 
provide an ideal platform for studying the interaction and 
properties of algorithmic information and static sequences of 
data because data can change form deep within, and as it 
travels through, the network 
A. Innovation and Security 
  Imagine a vulnerability identification process that consists of 
the following: waiting for an information system to be 
attacked, then, assuming it survives and one can detect the 
attack, analyzing the attack, and if the information system is 
still not compromised, adding this information to ones 
knowledge base. This technique would be unacceptable to 
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most people, but it is essentially the technique used today. 
Information assurance, and vulnerability analysis in particular, 
are hard problems primarily because they involve the 
application of the scientific method by a defender to determine 
a means of evaluating and thwarting the scientific method 
applied by an attacker (see Figure 1 for a conceptual 
illustration) [6][7].  
This self-reference of scientific methods would seem to 
imply a non-halting cycle of hypothesis and experimental 
validation being applied by both offensive and defensive 
entities, each affecting the operation of the other. Information 
assurance depends upon the ability to discover the 
relationships governing this cycle and then quantifying and 
measuring the progress made by both an attacker and defender. 
A metric and framework are required for quantifying 
information assurance in such an environment of escalating 
knowledge and innovation. Progress in vulnerability analysis 
and information assurance research cannot proceed without 
fundamental metrics. The metrics should identify and quantify 
fundamental characteristics of information in order to 
guarantee assurance.  
A fundamental definition of vulnerability analysis is 
formulated in this paper based upon attacker and defender as 
reasoning entities, capable of innovation. Truly innovative 
implementations of attack and defense lead to the evolution of 
complexity in an information system. Understanding the 
evolution of complexity in a system enables a better 
understanding of where to measure and how to quantify 
vulnerability. The design and implementation of a complexity-
based technique is presented in the form of a vulnerability 
analysis tool for automated measurement of information 
assurance. The motivation for complexity-based vulnerability 
analysis comes from the fact that complexity is a fundamental 
property of information and can be ubiquitously applied to 
determine vulnerability. 
 
 
Figure 1: A Kolmogorov Complexity Map (K-Map) 
Quantifies Vulnerabilities in a Network. 
B.  Challenges 
Complexity-based vulnerability analysis faces many 
challenges. In particular, the length of time required to obtain 
an accurate sample (with the goal of performing the analysis in 
real-time) is critical. In addition, a stream of data on a network 
link can be sampled at many possible protocol layers. What 
effect do layers of protocol and encoding have upon the 
complexity of an information stream? Can these effects be 
treated as noise and filtered out? The attacker may view 
protocol and data at a variety of levels: bit, system call, object 
code, source code, script, etc All of these levels coexist 
simultaneously and need to be considered as part of the 
Kolmogorov Complexity Map of the system. Map is a less 
than perfect term, because given the simultaneous coexistence 
of layers of protocol and encoding in an information stream, a 
three dimensional view (that includes complexity, component 
location, and depth through layers of encoding) might be more 
apt. A potential attacker is looking for areas of complexity low 
enough to observe, understand, and thus control (yet that also 
provide a path to a potential target) but also, in some cases, 
high enough in complexity in which to potentially hide 
activity. However, the ability for the attacker to successfully 
hide his activity depends upon first obtaining a good 
understanding of the system (defined as a function of 
complexity) in which to hide. For example, the attacker clearly 
has a greater understanding of the operation of the rightmost 
link in Figure 2 based upon his smaller size description of the 
complete operation of the link. By the same measure, the same 
attacker has a lesser understanding of the operation of the 
leftmost link. One would expect the attacker to utilize his/her 
greater knowledge of the rightmost link to spoof or otherwise 
manipulate that link to his/her advantage. 
 
Figure 2: Attackers Choice. Less Randomness, Smaller 
Description Implies Greater Knowledge of Rightmost Link. 
II. DETECTING VARIATION IN THE COMPLEXITY LANDSCAPE 
With regard to generating a complexity map of an 
information system, a significant assumption is that the 
complexity landscape has enough variation to allow useful 
discrimination. It is possible that the smallest descriptive 
length of different semantic types, depending upon how one 
chooses to partition the space of semantic types, may be equal 
or differ by an imperceptible amount. To compound the 
problem, the best that can be achieved is an approximation of 
the smallest descriptive length; error is implicit in complexity 
measurement. One would intuitively expect that the smallest 
representation of an entity would be the best discriminator 
because all redundant information is removed and only a 
unique essence of the entity remains. The techniques used in 
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this paper seek to maximize discrimination capability based 
upon the smallest representation of a sequence.  
An input stream (Figure 3) arriving into the complexity 
probes classifier can be comprised of different types of 
information. The classifier uses a Kolmogorov Complexity 
estimate of the input stream to categorize incoming data into 
what is described as a semantic type: namely, Audio, MS 
Word Document, Executable, Image, ASCII Text, or Video. 
Clearly other classification types are possible including finer 
resolution of types and orientation to other applications, such 
as genomic information for Bioinformatics applications. The 
ability to discriminate among semantic types based solely 
upon the complexity of bit-streams has significant 
implications. The Kolmogorov Complexity estimate of an 
actual system can be mapped and such a mapping provides 
practical and useful information. Detecting embedded 
semantic types, such as an executable within a document for 
example, can be performed without signatures or a priori 
information such as tags or magic numbers that could be 
easily spoofed. 
 
Figure 3: Experimental Classification of Semantic Types 
Cased upon Their Complexity. 
A. Framework and Experimental Test Set 
A consistent experimental test set consisting of at least ten 
randomly chosen samples of each type of data is used 
throughout all the experiments in this document. In Figure 4 
details of the classifier are shown. Data can be sampled, 
filtered, and partitioned into windows. The goal of this 
research has been to avoid sampling and filtering, although 
components in the code have been implemented to perform 
this function. Currently, no sampling has been used, that is, all 
data flows through the system. Filtering has been used only to 
extract header or payload data when examining protocol data. 
The complexity estimator examines the input data stream one 
window at a time and returns an estimate of its complexity. 
Then the Mapper determines a semantic type based upon the 
complexity estimate. The data stream can continue to flow 
through the probe unchanged (although undergoing a delay 
which is discussed in more detail later in this paper). The 
semantic type for each window is then returned. 
 
Figure 4: Components of the Complexity Probe. 
The complexity estimators fit into the complexity estimator 
module illustrated in Figure 5. The estimator set currently 
implemented is comprised of a simple entropy estimator (H) 
whose results are based upon the entropy of a weighting of one 
bits found in a binary sequence, Limpel-Zev (LZ) 
compression, Zip (Zip) compression, bZip (bZip) 
compression, and a frequency-based FFT estimator technique 
(Psi). The novel Optimal Symbol Compression Ratio (OSCR) 
technique [10], although shown in the framework, will have its 
results published in other venues. Note that multiple 
estimators can work in parallel to discriminate semantic types. 
 
Figure 5: Plug and Play Complexity Estimators. 
Tunable parameters of the complexity probe are shown in 
Figure 6, namely, specification of filters, sampling rate, 
window size, and the set of estimator algorithms enabled. The 
output can be either a single semantic type to identify a file 
or a vector of semantic types, one for each window. 
 
Figure 6: Tunable Parameters of the Complexity Probe. 
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B. Discrimination Results 
Initial techniques used to estimate semantic type based upon 
complexity used discriminate analysis. The results from a 
discriminate analysis using only the Zip estimator are shown in 
Figure 7. The squared distance between semantic types are 
relatively large except in the case of the distances circled in 
red. These types are so close to one another that it would be 
anticipated that these types would yield a high error rate in 
discriminating among these types. The full paper will elaborate 
on the efficiency in discriminating these challenging types. 
 
Figure 7: Discriminant Analysis Estimates of Probe 
Accuracy. 
Figure 8 shows early results on the accuracy of the 
complexity-based system to discriminate among semantic 
types. The histogram columns represent the percent of data 
from the experimental test set correctly classified. The 
columns represent Zip, Entropy, Limpel-Zev, Limpel-Zev and 
Entropy as a combined discriminator, Limpel-Zev and Entropy 
and Zip as a combined discriminator, and finally the last 
combined estimator used with audio and executables as a 
combined type, MS Word and text as a combined type, and 
Images and video as combined types. 
 
Figure 8: Early Performance Results for Discrimination of 
Six Semantic Types. 
C. Timing Profile 
It is hypothesized that the complexity estimator, the actual 
complexity of the data, and the widow size will have the 
greatest effects on the timing. Figure 9 shows the mean 
complexity for each estimator for the entire experimental test 
set. Zip (Z) yields the lowest expected complexity while 
Entropy (E) yields the highest. However, in terms of time, 
bZip (BZ) and Limpel-Zev (LZ) take the longest expected 
amount of time with LZ taking the longest. 
 
Figure 9: Complexity Estimator Timing Profile. 
In Figure 10 and Figure 11 the expected amount of time for 
each estimator is shown for each semantic type as a function of 
both window size and complexity of the sequence in the 
window. In every case, a larger window size requires more 
time to estimate complexity. However, a larger window size 
also yields an increase in throughput. A complete throughput 
analysis has been performed with selected results shown in 
Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
 
Figure 10: Time (Milliseconds) Versus Window Size (Bytes) 
for the Video Data Test Set. 
 Clearly the time versus complexity plots show that time to 
estimate complexity decreases with increasing complexity. 
This relationship is intuitive since more patterns in a sequence 
indicate lower complexity and require more time to discern 
each pattern. 
 
Figure 11: Time (Milliseconds) Versus Complexity 
Estimate for Video Data Test Set (Ten Video Files). 
As shown in Figure 12, the measured expected time 
(milliseconds) for the estimators (and combinations of 
estimators) to operate upon the complete semantic data set is 
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shown as a function of the percentage of types correctly 
discriminated. Note that the symbol (+) in the legend of 
Figure 12 implies that the corresponding values are used in the 
process of discrimination, not an explicit summation of the 
values.  Figure 13 illustrates the improvement in 
discrimination as the compression ratio improves. One 
interpretation of Figure 13 is that, as a more accurate estimate 
of complexity is being achieved, discrimination improves. 
 
Figure 12: Timing versus Discrimination Capability. 
 
Figure 13: Better Discrimination with Increased 
Compression Rates. 
 
Figure 14: Throughput for Z and H per Semantic Type. 
 
Figure 15: Throughput for Psi, LZ, and BZ per Semantic 
Type. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Data types (semantic types) can be identified by estimates of 
their complexity. Thus, a map of complexity can identify 
suspicious types, such as executable data embedded within 
passive data types, without resorting to predefined headers, 
signatures, or other limiting a priori information. Details 
regarding the mapping of complexity estimates to semantic 
type and on individual complexity estimators will appear in 
future papers. 
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